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Abstract
This paper provides a suﬃcient condition for existence and uniqueness of equilib-
rium, which is in monotone pure strategies, in a broad class of Bayesian games. The
argument requires that the incremental interim payoﬀ—the expected payoﬀ diﬀer-
ence between any two actions, conditional on a player’s realised type—satisﬁes two
conditions. The ﬁrst is uniform strict single-crossing with respect to own type.
The second condition is Lipschitz continuity with respect to opponents’ strategies.
Our main result shows that, if these two conditions are satisﬁed, and the bounding
parameters satisfy a particular inequality, then the best response correspondence
is a contraction, and hence there is a unique equilibrium of the Bayesian game.
Furthermore, this equilibrium is in monotone pure strategies. We characterize the
uniform monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity conditions in terms of the model
primitives. We also consider a number of examples to illustrate how the approach
can be used in applications.
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This paper provides a suﬃcient condition for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium,
which is in monotone pure strategies, in a broad class of games of incomplete information.
A suﬃcient condition for existence and uniqueness has been established for global games
(see among others Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003)). More generally, existence, but
not uniqueness, of monotone pure strategy equilibrium has been established for Bayesian
games that satisfy a Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property: see e.g., the seminal paper
of Athey (2001). Our contribution is to establish a simple condition that ensures both
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in monotone pure strategies in a broad class of
games.
The basic intuition for our result is relatively straightforward. Consider the incremen-
tal interim payoﬀ—the expected payoﬀ diﬀerence between any two actions, conditional
on a player’s realised type. Two factors aﬀect this: a player’s own type (a non-strategic
eﬀect), and the strategy proﬁle of its opponents (a strategic interaction). We require a
player’s incremental interim payoﬀ to be strictly increasing in its type. This means that
a player’s best response must be in monotone pure strategies, whatever strategy proﬁle
is played by its opponents. Uniqueness of equilibrium would clearly follow if opponents’
strategies have no eﬀect on a player’s best response. More generally, we require in addi-
tion that a player’s type has a greater eﬀect than its opponents’ strategy proﬁle on its
incremental interim payoﬀ. A large number of papers have observed that multiple equilib-
ria can arise when strategic interactions are important. (We discuss some of these papers
below.) This second suﬃcient condition ensures that strategic interaction is dominated
by non-strategic eﬀects. Consequently, when our suﬃcient conditions are satisﬁed, there
is a unique equilibrium, which is monotone pure strategies.
We formulate this intuition in a rigorous manner and show that if two bounds are
satisﬁed, then the best response correspondence is a contraction, which ensures both ex-
istence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Our ﬁrst bound is uniform strict single-crossing
with respect to own type. This condition requires the incremental interim payoﬀ to be
1strictly increasing in a player’s type, with the rate of increase uniformly bounded from
below by a strictly positive constant ϕ1. An immediate consequence of this condition is
that the strict single crossing property holds for any strategy proﬁle played by opponents;
hence each player’s best response to any strategy proﬁle is a monotone pure strategy. The
second condition is Lipschitz continuity with respect to opponents’ strategies. This con-
dition requires a change in the strategy proﬁle of a player’s opponents to have a bounded
eﬀect on the incremental interim payoﬀ, where the bound is a positive uniform (Lipschitz)
constant ϕ2. Our main result shows that, if the incremental interim payoﬀ satisﬁes uni-
form strict single-crossing and Lipschitz continuity, and if the bounding constants satisfy
ϕ2 < ϕ1, then the best response correspondence is a contraction, and hence there is a
unique equilibrium of the game of incomplete information. Furthermore, this equilibrium
is in monotone pure strategies.
Having established a suﬃcient condition for existence and uniqueness in terms of
bounds on the incremental interim payoﬀ, we relate the suﬃcient condition to bounds
on ex post payoﬀs and conditional densities, for two classes of applications: continuous
games (in which ex post payoﬀs are Lipschitz continuous in actions), and discontinuous
games (such as auctions). The details of the bounds vary across the two classes. But
they share common features. First, a player’s payoﬀ must be suﬃciently sensitive to its
own type. Secondly, the eﬀect that the realised actions have on the ex post payoﬀ of each
player is bounded above; hence strategic interactions cannot be too important. Finally,
players cannot have ‘too much’ information about the types of their opponents. (What
‘too much’ means varies according to the application.) These three features ensure that
higher types prefer higher actions, and hence best responses are monotone pure strategies.
They also ensure that best responses are suﬃciently insensitive to opponents’ strategies.
Another well-known approach to existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is developed
in the literature on global games. Global games are games of incomplete information
where type spaces are determined by the players each observing a noisy signal of an
underlying state; see Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998), Morris
2and Shin (2003) and Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003). If players’ actions are strict
strategic complements, if there are “dominance regions” (i.e., types for which there is a
strictly dominant action), and if players’ signals are suﬃciently informative about the
true underlying state, then global games have a unique, dominance solvable equilibrium.
Existence of equilibrium is assured by the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) on
supermodular games. In the unique surviving strategy proﬁle, each player’s action is
a nondecreasing function of its signal i.e., the unique equilibrium is in monotone pure
strategies.
A major advantage of our approach, relative to global games, is that we require
neither strategic complementarities nor dominance regions. Dispensing with these two
assumptions means that iterated elimination of dominated strategies cannot be used
to solve for equilibrium. Our approach therefore diﬀers in terms of technical detail:
instead of iterated deletion, we use a contraction mapping. It also diﬀers in terms of
the detailed intuition for the result. At one level, both approaches generate uniqueness
by introducing heterogeneity of some type. In a global game, uniqueness requires that a
player’s assessment of the probability that an opponent’s type is lower than his should
be suﬃciently insensitive to the player’s type. This occurs when heterogeneity is very
small and highly correlated. In contrast, our approach requires large heterogeneity, in
two ways: a player’s type is suﬃciently uninformative about the types of its opponents;
and conditional densities are bounded above. (See Morris and Shin (2005) for further
discussion of this distinction.) In summary: our approach shares with global games the
general feature of establishing a unique equilibrium, which is in monotone pure strategies;
but in all other respects, the two approaches are distinct.
A number of papers have analysed conditions under which monotone pure strategy
equilibria exist in class of incomplete information games that are broader than global
games. In particular, Athey (2001) establishes existence of monotone pure strategy equi-
libria, using a single crossing condition (SCC) on incremental interim payoﬀs. This con-
dition requires that, when higher types play weakly higher actions, the diﬀerence in a
3player’s interim payoﬀ from a high action versus a low one crosses zero at most once and
from below, as a function of its type. She shows further that games in which ex post
payoﬀs are supermodular or log-supermodular in all players’ actions and types, and in
which types are aﬃliated, satisfy the SCC.1
While there is some relation between our paper and this literature—both establish
existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium—there are several diﬀerences. Our ob-
jective of establishing uniqueness, rather than just existence, means that our assumptions
and methods are quite diﬀerent. We, like Athey and McAdams, require a single-crossing
condition, but one which is stricter than theirs. Furthermore, we require that each player’s
incremental interim payoﬀ is Lipschitz continuous in opponents’ strategies. These diﬀer-
ent conditions on incremental interim payoﬀs translate to diﬀerent assumptions on the
model primitives. The technical details of our argument are quite diﬀerent from those
of Athey and McAdams, who both establish convexity of the best-response correspon-
dence in order to apply a ﬁxed point theorem. In contrast, we use a contraction mapping
argument. We therefore see our approach and e.g., Athey’s as complementary.
Finally, our analysis helps to clarify the mechanism at work in a number of previ-
ous papers that have found, in a variety of situations, that heterogeneity can ensure
uniqueness of equilibrium. For example, in a canonical two-by-two public good model in
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 211–213), there are two pure strategy equilibria in the
common knowledge game. If the distribution of types satisﬁes certain conditions, there is
only one equilibrium in the incomplete information game. One such condition is that the
maximum value of the density is suﬃciently small; following Grandmont (1992), this can
be interpreted as requiring a suﬃcient degree of heterogeneity between the players. Bur-
dzy, Frankel, and Pauzner (2001) demonstrate that there can be a unique equilibrium in a
1Earlier work, e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1985), established existence of pure strategy equilibria in
games with a ﬁnite number of actions and (conditionally) independent types, but without requiring
strategic complementarity. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) use lattice-theoretic methods
to establish the existence pure strategy equilibria in supermodular games; these equilibria need not be
monotone. McAdams (2003) generalizes Athey (2001) to multidimensional action and type spaces. Van
Zandt and Vives (2005) take a diﬀerent approach to establish existence using lattice-theoretic methods.
In recent work, Reny (2006) has shown that the SCC can be weakened by using a particular ﬁxed point
theorem, when ex post payoﬀs are continuous in actions.
4model in which players face exogenous shocks, can change their action only occasionally,
and are heterogeneous in the frequency with which they can change their action. Her-
rendorf, Valentinyi, and Waldmann (2000) show how heterogeneity in the manufacturing
productivity (rather than the information) of agents in a two-sector, increasing returns-
to-scale model can remove indeterminacy and multiplicity of equilibrium. Glaeser and
Scheinkman (2003) show that if there is not too much heterogeneity among players, then
there can be multiple equilibria in social interaction games. In all of these papers, het-
erogeneity plays some part in ensuring the uniqueness of equilibrium. Our analysis shows
exactly what form of heterogeneity is needed, in terms of the informational structure of
the game; and exactly what mechanism is at work when heterogeneity yields uniqueness.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the general analysis,
identifying the suﬃcient condition to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium. In sections 3 and
4, we characterize our suﬃcient condition for equilibrium existence and uniqueness for
two classes of applications: continuous and discontinuous games. Section 5 concludes.
Longer proofs are in the appendix.
2 The General Model
Consider a game of incomplete information between I players, i ∈ I ≡ {1,...,I}, where
each player ﬁrst observes its own type, ti ∈ Ti ≡ [
¯
ti,¯ ti] ⊂ R and then takes an action ai
from an action set Ai that is a compact subset of the real line Ai ⊂ R. Let a denote an
action proﬁle: a = (a1,...,aI); and let A ≡ ×Ai the space of action proﬁles. A type
proﬁle and the space of type proﬁles are similarly deﬁned as t ≡ (t1,...,tI) and T ≡ ×Ti.
Finally, let a−i denote the proﬁle of actions of all other players, and A−i the space of
all such action proﬁles. A similar notation is adopted for type proﬁles, strategy proﬁles,
marginals etc.. The joint distribution of players’ types is given by the probability measure
η on the (Borel) subsets of T. The marginal distribution on each Ti is denoted ηi.
Players use behavioural strategies. A behavioural strategy for player i is a measurable
5function µi : Ai × Ti → [0,1] where Ai is the collection of Borel subsets of Ai, with
the following properties: (i) for every B ∈ Ai, the function µi(B,·) : Ti → [0,1] is
measurable; (ii) for every ti ∈ Ti, the function µi(·,ti) : Ai → [0,1] is a probability
measure. Hence when player i observes its type ti, it selects an action in Ai according to
the measure µi(·,ti). A pure strategy in behavioural form is simply a function that returns
a probability measure that is concentrated on the graph of a classical pure strategy.2 A
monotone pure strategy is a pure strategy such that a player of higher type chooses a
weakly higher action than a player of lower type. Denote the set of behavioural strategies
for player i by Mi.
Let µ−i ∈ M−i denote the vector of behavioural strategies played by the opponents of
player i. The interim payoﬀ of player i (i.e., when it knows its type ti) is written as:
Ui(ai,ti,µ−i) =
Z
T−i
Z
A−i
ui(a,t)
Y
j6=i
dµj(·,tj)f(t−i|ti)dt−i
where f(t−i|ti) is the conditional density of types. Let the incremental interim payoﬀ be
deﬁned as
∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,µ−i) ≡ Ui(ai,ti,µ−i) − Ui(a
0
i,ti,µ−i).
The following basic assumption is maintained throughout the paper:
A1 The payoﬀ function ui : A × T → R is bounded and measurable, and upper semi-
continuous in ai. The types have conditional densities with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. The conditional density of t−i given ti, is denoted f(t−i|ti) for i ∈ I; it is
strictly positive.
Assumption A1 is standard and ensures that the interim payoﬀ Ui(·) exists and that
players possess best responses.
2An alternative approach would use distributional strategies. A distributional strategy for player i is a
probability measure µi on Ai ×Ti such that the marginal distribution on Ti is ηi i.e., µi(Ai ×S) = ηi(S)
for any Borel subset S of Ti; see Milgrom and Weber (1985). As Milgrom and Weber show, there is
a many-to-one mapping from behavioural strategies to distributional strategies. In fact, there is little
diﬀerence between the two approaches here, since we establish quickly (see lemma 1) a suﬃcient condition
so that in equilibrium, only monotone pure strategies are used. It is slightly more convenient, however,
to use behavioural strategies.
6Two conditions are central to our argument.
Deﬁnition 1 (Uniform Strict Single-Crossing) There is a constant ϕ1 > 0 such that
for all ai ≥ a0
i, ti ≥ t0
i and µ−i ∈ M−i,
∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,µ−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,µ−i) ≥ ϕ1(ti − t
0
i)(ai − a
0
i). (1)
Note that deﬁnition 1 involves a stronger condition than the single-crossing property
that is commonly used (see e.g., Athey (2001)). Uniform strict single-crossing implies
single crossing: and in fact, it ensures that single-crossing holds for all µ−i ∈ M, and not
just for opponents’ strategy proﬁles that are monotonic. Uniform strict single-crossing
implies, in addition, that there is strict single crossing. Moreover, it requires that the
same lower bound ϕ1 can be used for all ai ≥ a0
i, ti ≥ t0
i and µ−i ∈ M−i.
We use next the results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) to establish that uniform
strict single-crossing implies that a player’s best response to any strategy proﬁle of its
opponents is a monotone pure strategy.
Lemma 1 Suppose that assumption A1 holds. If uniform strict single-crossing holds,
then any best response of player i ∈ I to any proﬁle of opponents’ strategies is a monotone
pure strategy.
Proof The action set Ai is totally ordered (because {0,1} ⊆ Ai ⊂ [0,1]), implying
that Ui(ai,ti,µ−i) is quasi-supermodular in ai.3 Moreover, Ai is independent of ti, and
Ti ∈ R is also totally ordered. Given uniform strict single-crossing, Ui(ai,ti,µ−i) satisﬁes
the strict single crossing property. Therefore by the Monotone Selection Theorem 4’ of
Milgrom and Shannon (1994), every selection from the set argmaxai∈Ai Ui(ai,ti,µ−i) is
monotone non-decreasing in ti. The strict single crossing property implies that there is
indiﬀerence only on sets of measure zero. 
3A function h : X → R on a lattice X is quasi-supermodular if (i) h(x) ≥ h(x∧y) implies h(x∨y) ≥
h(y) and (ii) h(x) > h(x ∨ y) > h(y). Here, ∧ is the greatest lower bound, or meet operator; ∨ is the
least lower bound, or join operator.
7For the rest of this section, we maintain the assumption of uniform strict single-
crossing. We can, therefore, restrict attention to monotone pure strategies for each player
i ∈ I. Denote a monotone pure strategy by αi : Ti → Ai, where αi(ti) ≥ αi(t0
i) for ti ≥ t0
i.
Let α(t) be the monotone pure strategy proﬁle, and α−i(t−i) be the strategy proﬁle of the
opponents of player i. Let S be the set of joint monotone pure strategies, and φ : S → S
be the vector of best reply correspondences. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a ﬁxed point
of φ.
Next we introduce a metric that is used in stating our second important condition.
Let d on S be deﬁned as4
d(α,α
0) ≡ sup
i∈I
sup
ρ∈R
{ti−t
0
i|αi(τi)<ρ<α
0
i(τi) ∨ α
0
i(τi)<ρ<αi(τi),∀τi ∈ [t
0
i,ti] ⊂ Ti}. (2)
Thus, d(α,α0) is the supremum of the length of all intervals over which for some player
i, and some ρ ∈ R, one of αi(ti) and α0
i(ti) is strictly above ρ and the other is strictly
below ρ.5 It is easy to see that d satisﬁes the properties of a metric, and that it renders
the space of joint pure strategies a complete metric space. It is also noteworthy that in
the case of discrete action space, it is related to Athey (2001) representation of monotone
pure strategies. Let xi = (xij)K
j=1 be a vector of jump points in player i’s monotone pure
strategy, where the jump points indicate the type at which player i switches from action
j to action j0; K is the cardinality of Ai. The joint vector of jump points x therefore
represents α. Then d(α,α0) = maxi maxj |xij − x0
ij|.
The second condition which is central to our argument is the following.
Deﬁnition 2 (Lipschitz Continuity) There is a ﬁnite constant ϕ2 ≥ 0 such that for
all ai ≥ a0
i and any two monotone pure strategy proﬁles α−i,α0
−i,
|∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α
0
−i)| ≤ ϕ2(ai − a
0
i)d(α−i,α
0
−i), (3)
4In this deﬁnition, ∨ is the logical operator ‘or’.
5We are indebted to an anonymous referee who suggested this metric.
8where d(·,·) is the metric deﬁned in equation (2).
In sections 3 and 4, we derive conditions on the primitives of the model (ex post payoﬀs
and conditional densities) that ensure that uniform strict single-crossing and Lipschitz
continuity of the incremental interim payoﬀ are satisﬁed.
We now prove that assumption A1, uniform strict single-crossing and Lipschitz con-
tinuity ensure existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We do this in two steps. Lemma
1 means that any equilibrium must be in monotone pure strategies. Our main result in
theorem 1 gives a suﬃcient condition (consistent with lemma 1) that ensures that the cor-
respondence φ(α) is a contraction mapping, and hence that there is a unique equilibrium,
which is in monotone pure strategies.
Theorem 1 If assumption A1, uniform strict single-crossing and Lipschitz continuity
hold, and if ϕ2 < ϕ1, then the best response correspondence is a contraction, and hence
there is a unique equilibrium of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, this equilibrium is in
monotone pure strategies.
Proof See the appendix. 
The intuition for theorem 1 can be seen most clearly when there are two players,
i ∈ {1,2} and two actions, {0,1}. Uniform monotonicity means that, in equilibrium,
both players use monotone pure strategies. For simplicity, suppose that there is no
dominant action i.e., it is never the case that one of the actions is strictly preferred by
all types. Hence high (low) types prefer to play action 1 (0); and there is a threshold
type of player i who is indiﬀerent between the two actions i.e., whose incremental interim
payoﬀ is zero. Now consider two strategies chosen by player −i, both of which can be
summarised by the threshold types t0
−i and t00
−i, say. By Lipschitz continuity, the diﬀerence
in player i’s incremental interim payoﬀs, for player −i’s two strategies, is no greater than
ϕ2 times the distance between player −i’s strategies. The proof of the theorem uses the
particular metric in equation (2); in this simple case with binary actions, this metric is
just the diﬀerence between player −i’s threshold types in the two strategies: |t0
−i − t00
−i|.
9ti
∆Ui 0 ∆Ui(t0
−i) ∆Ui(t00
−i) ≤ ϕ2|t0
−i − t00
−i|
slope ≥ ϕ1
≤
ϕ2
ϕ1|t0
−i − t00
−i|
t00
i t0
i
Figure 1: Illustration of Theorem 1
By uniform strict single-crossing, player i’s incremental interim payoﬀ increases in its type
at a rate greater than ϕ1. Hence the change in player i’s threshold type can be no greater
than ϕ2/ϕ1 times the diﬀerence in player −i’s threshold types. The suﬃcient condition
ϕ2 < ϕ1 then ensures that the change in player i’s threshold types is strictly less than the
change in player −i’s thresholds. Consequently, the best reply of player i is a contraction.
This argument is illustrated in ﬁgure 1, where, for clarity, player i’s incremental interim
payoﬀ is drawn as being continuously diﬀerentiable and linear in type.6
The intuition for theorem 1 will be developed further in the next two sections, where
we derive conditions on the primitives of the model. We conclude this section with three
remarks. First, weak single-crossing, where the bound ϕ1 = 0, is insuﬃcient for our
result, since the strict inequality ϕ2 < ϕ1 cannot then hold. Secondly, continuity, where
the bound ϕ2 can be arbitrarily large, is also insuﬃcient for our result, for exactly the
same reason. Thirdly, the uniform bounds involved in the uniform strict single-crossing
and Lipschitz continuity conditions are stronger than is, strictly speaking, necessary.
6In the ﬁgure, ∆Ui(t0
−i) denotes player i’s incremental interim payoﬀ when player −i uses the monotone
pure strategy with threshold t0
−i.
10The bounding parameters ϕ1 and ϕ2 could depend on the action pairs ai,a0
i, the type
pairs ti,t0
i and the strategy proﬁle pairs µ−i,µ0
−i. The suﬃcient condition in theorem
1 would then be ϕ2(ai,a0
i,ti,µ−i,µ0
−i) < ϕ1(ai,a0
i,ti,t0
i,µ−i) for all ai ≥ a0
i, ti ≥ t0
i,
and monotone pure strategy proﬁles µ−i,µ0
−i. This suﬃcient condition would be very
diﬃcult to check in applications. Hence we consider only uniform strict single-crossing
and Lipschitz continuity, where the bounding parameters are uniform.
3 Characterizing the existence and uniqueness con-
dition: continuous games
The aim of this section is to ﬁnd conditions on the primitives of the model—the ex post
payoﬀ ui(a,t) and the conditional density f(t−i|ti) for each player i ∈ I—that ensure
that the incremental interim payoﬀ satisﬁes monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity. There
are two reasons to do this. The ﬁrst is that it provides further intuition for how we can
ensure existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, in monotone pure strategies. The second
is that the conditions on the ex post payoﬀ and conditional density are easier to check in
applications.
We ﬁrst note that, if there are types that have a strictly dominant action, then clearly
the best response correspondence is uniquely deﬁned for these types. Any assumptions
on payoﬀs and conditional densities that are imposed to ensure existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium need apply, therefore, only for types that do not have a strictly dominant
action. Hence, deﬁne
Di(ai) ≡

ti ∈ Ti | ai = argmax
a∈Ai
ui(a,a−i,ti,t−i) ∀a−i ∈ A−i and t−i ∈ T−i
	
.
That is, Di(ai) is the set of types for player i over which ai is a dominant action. Notice
11that Di(ai) could be empty i.e., ∅ ⊆ Di(ai) ⊂ Ti. Let
Di ≡ ∪ai∈AiDi(ai).
Di is therefore the set of dominance regions for player i. Finally, let ˆ Ti ≡ Ti \Di, so that
ˆ Ti is the set of types for player i over which there is no dominant action.
Our ﬁrst step is to bound payoﬀ eﬀects in the non-dominance regions. In the following,
actions ai,a0
i ∈ Ai and types ti,t0
i ∈ ˆ Ti, for all i ∈ I. Let
∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a−i,t) ≡ ui(ai,a−i,t) − ui(a
0
i,a−i,t)
denote the incremental ex post payoﬀ.
U1 Uniformly Positive Sensitivity to Own Action and Type. There is a δ ∈
(0,∞) such that for all ai ≥ a0
i, ti ≥ t0
i, a−i,t−i and i ∈ I,
∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a−i,ti,t−i) − ∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a−i,t
0
i,t−i) ≥ δ(ai − a
0
i)(ti − t
0
i).
U2 Lipschitz Continuity to Own Action. There is an ω ∈ (0,∞) such that for all
ai ≥ a0
i, a−i,t, and i ∈ I,
|∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a−i,t)| ≤ ω(ai − a
0
i).
U3 Uniformly Bounded Sensitivity to Opponents’ Action. There is a κ ∈ (0,∞)
such that for all ai ≥ a0
i,a−i,a0
−i,t and i ∈ I,
|∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a−i,t) − ∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a
0
−i,t)| ≤ κ(ai − a
0
i).
12Assumption U1 essentially requires that a higher type makes a higher action more
appealing to a player. It is similar to, but stronger than, an assumption that a player’s
payoﬀ function ui(ai,a−i,t) is supermodular in (ai,ti).7 In our case, supermodularity of
ui in (ai,ti) implies that ∆ui(ai,a0
i,a−i,ti,t−i) ≥ ∆ui(ai,a0
i,a−i,t0
i,t−i); clearly, therefore,
the uniform boundedness assumption is stronger. Nevertheless, the assumption is satisﬁed
in a large number of games, including many supermodular games.
Assumptions U1 and U2 place restrictions on the incremental ex post payoﬀ, illustrated
in ﬁgure 2. The incremental ex post payoﬀ ∆ui(ai,a0
i,a−i,ti,t−i) must lie in the shaded
area drawn in the ﬁgure, bounded from below by −ω(ai − a0
i) and above by −ω(ai − a0
i)
(by assumption U2), with the boundaries having slope δ (by assumption U1). Moreover,
∆ui(ai,a0
i,a−i,ti,t−i) must have a slope of at least δ (again by assumption U1). The
curve in the ﬁgure illustrates a possibility for the function ∆ui(ai,a0
i,a−i,ti,t−i).
In addition to the assumptions on ex post payoﬀs, we make the following assumptions
about the conditional density:
D1 There is a ι ∈ (0,∞) such that for any ti > t0
i and i ∈ I,
p
I(ti,t0
i) ≤ ι(ti − t0
i),
where
I(ti,t
0
i) ≡ VarT−i

f(t−i|ti) − f(t−i|t0
i)
f(t−i|ti)

.
D2 There is a ν ∈ [0,∞) such that fj(tj|ti) ≤ ν for all i,j ∈ I and j 6= i where
fj(tj|ti) =
Z
×
k6=i,j
Tk
f(t−i|ti)dt−i.
7Let X be a lattice i.e., a partially ordered set that includes both the meet ∧ (the greatest lower
bound) and join ∨ (the least upper bound) of any two elements in the set. A function h : X → R
is supermodular if, for all x,y ∈ X, h(x ∨ y) + h(x ∧ y) ≥ h(x) + h(y). In the case that h is twice
diﬀerentiable, h is supermodular if and only if
∂2
∂xi∂xj
h(x) ≥ 0
for all i,j; see Topkis (1998).
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∆ui 0 ω(ai − a0
i) −ω(ai − a0
i) Slope = δ
¯
ti ¯ ti
Figure 2: Assumptions U1 and U2
The function deﬁned in assumption D1 is the expectation of the square of a likelihood
ratio:
ET−i
"
f(t−i|t0
i)
f(t−i|ti)
2#
,
and so is a measure of diﬀerential information. In the case that the conditional density
f(t−i|ti) is diﬀerentiable in ti, the function is related to the Fisher information of a
player’s type about the types of the opponents. To see this, consider the limit as t0
i → ti:
lim
ti→t0
i
I(ti,t0
i)
ti − t0
i
→ I(ti) ≡ VarT−i

∂ lnf(t−i|ti)
∂ti

.
I(ti) is the variance of a score function and so is the Fisher information, measuring how
sensitive the likelihood of other players’ types is to the type of player i. Hence assumption
D1 bounds the Fisher information in the model.
Assumption D2 introduces a particular type of heterogeneity, in terms of the upper
bound ν on the conditional density. This condition is similar to the one used by Grand-
mont (1992): we, like him, require the density function to be suﬃciently ﬂat.
These assumptions on ex post payoﬀs and conditional densities allow us to relate
14conditions on the primitives of the model to monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity, which
are properties of the incremental interim payoﬀ.
Theorem 2 Suppose that assumptions U1–U2 and D1 hold. If
δ > ιω, (4)
then uniform strict single-crossing is satisﬁed, with ϕ1 ≡ δ − ιω > 0.
Proof See the appendix. 
Theorem 2 shows that uniform strict single-crossing can be related to assumptions
U1–U2 and D1 on the primitives of the model. Assumption U1 implies that, all other
things equal, a higher type prefers a higher action. This is the basic force towards players’
incremental interim payoﬀs satisfying a strict single crossing property, and hence towards
players using monotone pure strategies. This basic force can, however, be overturned by
strategic interaction. A player with a higher type has a diﬀerent posterior over the types
of its opponents; and therefore diﬀerent beliefs about the actions that will be played by its
opponents. The higher-type player may therefore evaluate the incremental interim payoﬀ
between a higher and lower action diﬀerently from a lower-type player. This strategic
eﬀect may reinforce the non-strategic force; but it may counteract it.
Assumption D1 ensures that a higher type’s posterior cannot be too diﬀerent from a
lower type’s. Assumption U2 ensures that, even when posteriors are diﬀerent, a higher
type’s evaluation of the incremental interim payoﬀ between a higher and lower action is
not too diﬀerent from a lower type’s. Hence, if δ > ιω, then the strategic eﬀect is strictly
smaller than the non-strategic eﬀect.
Assumptions U1 and D1 can be contrasted to the conditions used by Athey (2001).
In our paper and Athey’s, the interim payoﬀ must satisfy a single crossing property in
incremental returns (SCP-IR).8 Athey shows that this condition is satisﬁed in games where
8A function h : R2 → R satisﬁes single crossing of incremental returns in (x,θ) if, for all xH > xL
and θH > θL, h(xH,θL) − h(xL,θL) ≥ (>)0 implies h(xH,θH) − h(xL,θH) ≥ (>)0. See Milgrom and
Shannon (1994).
15agents’ ex post utility is supermodular in a and (ai,tj), j ∈ I and types are aﬃliated (see
Athey (2001, theorem 3)). In contrast, we require that the ex post utility function ui is
uniformly increasing in own action and type, (ai,ti), a condition slightly stronger than
supermodularity in (ai,ti); and that types are not too associated. We can then show that
the interim payoﬀ satisﬁes a SCP-IR for any strategy proﬁle of opponents.
Note that our assumptions are neither weaker nor stronger than Athey’s. Our assump-
tion on payoﬀs is stronger in one sense, since it requires more than supermodularity; but
is weaker in another sense, in that it involves only own action and type. Similarly, our
distributional assumptions are stronger, since they limit the degree of association between
types; but they are weaker, since they allow for negative as well as positive correlation
between types. (Aﬃliation allows only for the latter.)
Theorem 3 Suppose that assumptions U1–U3 and D1–D2 hold; and that δ > ιω. Then
Lipschitz continuity is satisﬁed, with ϕ2 ≡ νκ.
Proof See the appendix. 
The next theorem is an immediate corollary of theorems 2 and 3 and is therefore
stated without proof.
Theorem 4 If assumptions U1–U3 and D1– D2 hold, and if
δ > ιω + νκ, (5)
then the best response correspondence is a contraction; and hence there is a unique equilib-
rium of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, this equilibrium is in monotone pure strategies.
Condition (5) is similar to condition (4). Both conditions ensure that a player’s
own type dominates strategic interaction eﬀects in payoﬀ terms enough to make any
best response a monotone pure strategy. Roughly speaking, if condition (5) is satisﬁed,
then each player places more weight on its own type than on the possible actions of its
16opponents when choosing its best action. It does so by ensuring that the direct eﬀect
of a player’s type (measured by δ, according to assumption U1) is suﬃciently large. It
also ensures that the interaction eﬀect is suﬃciently weak, by limiting the size of the
eﬀects of both a player’s own action (measured by ω, according to assumption U2) and
its opponents’ actions (measured by κ, from assumption U3). Finally, it ensures that a
player’s type is suﬃciently uninformative about the types (and hence likely action) of
others (measured by ι and ν, according to assumptions D1 and D2).
Condition (5) is, however, stricter than condition (4), since it must both ensure that
players choose monotone pure strategies; and that the best response correspondence is a
contraction. The latter introduces two additional assumptions: U3 (bounding the eﬀect
of opponents’ actions) and D2 (bounding the conditional density). The proof makes clear
why these additional assumptions are required. Intuitively, to establish a contraction, a
player’s expected payoﬀ diﬀerence between two actions must be suﬃciently insensitive to
a change in the strategies of its opponents. This requires ﬁrst that the realised actions
of opponents should not aﬀect the ex post payoﬀ of a player too much. Assumption U3
ensures this. It also requires that the change in opponents’ strategies should not result in
a change in realised actions that is too large. Assumption D2 achieves this by ensuring
that there is not too much mass placed on any proﬁle of opponents’ types.
3.1 Applications
Given theorem 4, we must verify two types of condition in order to apply our results.
The ﬁrst is that the ex post payoﬀs and conditional densities in the application have
uniform bounds, as required by assumptions U1–U3 and D1–D2. The second is that the
suﬃcient condition in theorem 4 is satisﬁed. In this section, we consider a small number
of applications to see how this can be done.
Consider a variant of a Diamond-type search model. There are a ﬁnite number of
players N who exert eﬀort searching for trading partners. Any trader’s probability of
ﬁnding another particular trader is proportional to his own eﬀort and the total eﬀort of
17others. Let ai ∈ [0,1] be the eﬀort of player i. The ex post payoﬀ to player i is
ui = ai

1 +
X
j6=i
aj

v(ti) − C(ai).
ti is the type of player i, drawn from the compact interval [0,¯ t]. v(ti) : [0,¯ t] → [0, ¯ v] is a
continuous and hence bounded function. It is also diﬀerentiable and uniformly increasing,
so that there exists a δ > 0 such that v0(t) ≥ δ for all t ∈ [0,¯ t]. C(·) is a strictly increasing,
convex, diﬀerentiable function. Note that it is critical that in this example, a player can
increase the probability of a match through its own eﬀort, even if all other players exert
no eﬀort. If this were not true, then our approach could not be applied.
With these assumptions, this is a supermodular game, since ∂2ui/∂ai∂aj = v(ti) > 0.
Moreover,
∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a−i,ti,t−i) − ∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a−i,t
0
i,t−i)
= (ai − a
0
i)(1 +
X
j6=i
aj)(v(ti) − v(t
0
i)) ≥ (ai − a
0
i)(v(ti) − v(t
0
i)) ≥ δ(ai − a
0
i)(ti − t
0
i)
and so the game satisﬁes assumption U1. Assumption U2 is satisﬁed with ω ≡ N¯ v.
Assumption U3 is also satisﬁed, with κ ≡ N¯ v.
To complete the application, suppose that there are two players whose types may take
one of two values: ti ∈ {
¯
t,¯ t} for i ∈ {1,2}, where 0 <
¯
t < ¯ t < +∞. Let the conditional
densities be as follows: conditional on player i being type
¯
t (¯ t), the probability of player
j 6= i being type
¯
t (¯ t) is q ∈ [0.5,1].9 A straightforward calculation shows that, in this
case, the measure of diﬀerential information used in assumption D1 is
I =
(1 − 2q)2
q(1 − q)
.
Assumption D1 requires that there exists a ﬁnite constant, ι, such that
√
I ≤ ι; clearly,
9This example can be extended easily to allow for diﬀerent conditional probabilities, so that the
probability of player j being type
¯
t when player i is type
¯
t diﬀers from the probability of player j being
type ¯ t when player i is type ¯ t.
18this requires that q < 1. Alternatively, for any ι > 0, there exist 0 <
¯
qι < ¯ qι < 1 such
that
√
I ≤ ι for all q ∈ [
¯
qι, ¯ qι]. Assumption D2 is satisﬁed with ν = 1; alternatively, for
any given ν, the conditional density is less than ν for all q ∈ [
¯
qν, ¯ qν]. So, for a given ι > 0
and ν > 0, assumptions D1 and D2 are satisﬁed if q ∈ [
¯
qι, ¯ qι] ∩ [
¯
qν, ¯ qν].
The condition in theorem 4 is satisﬁed if
δ
¯ v
> 2

(1 − 2q)
p
q(1 − q)
+ 2

. (6)
For example, when q = 0.5, condition (6) requires that δ > 4¯ v. More generally, the
condition in theorem 4 is easier to satisfy when q is closer to 0.5.
Consider next a Cournot quantity game in which actions are output or investment
decisions, and types are (the negative of) marginal cost. The ex post payoﬀ of agent i in
this game is
ui(a,t) = ai(P(ai,a−i) + ti)
where P(·,·) is the inverse demand function. (This formulation allows for diﬀerentiated
goods and a general inverse demand function.) Then it is straightforward to show that
∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a−i,ti,t−i) − ∆ui(ai,a
0
i,a−i,t
0
i,t−i) = (ai − a
0
i)(ti − t
0
i),
which satisﬁes assumption U1, with δ = 1. Note that, since the inverse demand function
drops out of the expression in payoﬀ diﬀerences, it is not even necessary that demand be
downward-sloping. To complete the example, suppose that (inverse) demand is linear:
let A ≡
PN
i=1 ai be aggregate output, where N ≥ 2 is the number of ﬁrms. Let inverse
demand be
P(a) =

   
   
α − β
PN
i=1 ai
PN
i=1 ai < α
β
0
PN
i=1 ai ≥ α
β
where α and β are strictly positive constants, and N ≥ 2 is the number of ﬁrms. Suppose
19that ﬁrms’ marginal costs −ti are drawn independently from a lognormal distribution,
with a shaping parameter σ > 0. Note that is a dominant strategy for any ﬁrm with a
marginal cost greater than α to produce zero output. In this application, the bounding
parameters in our assumptions take the values: δ = 1; ω = max{i|−ti≤α}(α + ti) = α;
κ = β; ι = 0; and
ν =
exp(σ2
2 )
σ
√
2π
By theorem 4, there is a unique equilibrium, which is in monotone pure strategies, if
1 > 2β
exp(σ2
2 )
σ
√
2π
. (7)
The right-hand side of this inequality is a non-monotonic function of σ. Hence, for any
given β > 0, there exist 0 ≤
¯
σβ < ¯ σβ such that for all σ ∈ (
¯
σβ, ¯ σβ), there is a unique
equilibrium in the general Cournot oligopoly game, which is in monotone pure strategies
(i.e., ﬁrms with higher marginal costs produce less).
Our approach therefore establishes conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium in Cournot
(and other rent-seeking) games. There are few existing results in this area. Uniqueness
can be established with a standard contraction argument with a small number of ﬁrms;
the (suﬃcient) condition becomes harder to satisfy as the number grows. For example,
with a linear inverse demand curve, the suﬃcient condition is violated if there are more
than two ﬁrms. See Vives (1999). With two ﬁrms, Athey (2001)’s results can be used,
since in this case, the Cournot game is supermodular. Van Long and Soubeyran (2000)
is a recent contribution to the subject, also using a contraction mapping approach, but
based on a function involving costs.
In summary: our approach requires that two types of condition hold in a continuous
game. The ﬁrst there are uniform bounds, as required by assumptions U1–U3 and D1–
D2. This ﬁrst condition is relatively mild for Lipschitz continuous games, but does rule
out e.g., auctions. The second condition is that the suﬃcient condition in theorem 4 is
satisﬁed. This second condition restricts the range of (Lipschitz continuous) applications
20covered by our result. Our suﬃcient condition is likely to be violated in applications in
which players’ types are highly correlated, and in which the eﬀect of a player’s own type
on its ex post payoﬀ is dominated by the eﬀect of players’ actions.
4 Characterizing the existence and uniqueness con-
dition: discontinuous games
In the previous section, we derived conditions on ex post payoﬀs and the conditional
density that ensured uniform strict single-crossing and Lipschitz continuity of the in-
terim payoﬀ function. Assumptions U2 and U3 require that players’ payoﬀs are Lipschitz
continuous in their own and opponents’ actions. These assumptions are violated in dis-
continuous games, such as auctions, with a continuum of actions, in which a small change
in players’ actions can lead to a large change in payoﬀs.
In this section, we consider how our approach can be applied to these types of games.
We restrict attention to “standard auctions”:
Deﬁnition 3 A standard auction model has the following features:
• Player i’s action set is Ai ≡ [
¯
ai,¯ ai].
• Player i’s ex post payoﬀ function when losing is
¯
vi(ai,t) : Ai×T → R. The function
∆
¯
vi(ai,a0
i,ti,t−i) ≡
¯
vi(ai,ti,t−i)−
¯
vi(a0
i,ti,t−i) is a function only of ai,a0
i and ti and
is non-decreasing in (−ai,ti).10
• Player i’s ex post payoﬀ function when winning is ¯ vi(ai,t) : Ai × T → R.
• The payoﬀ functions
¯
vi(·,·) and ¯ vi(·,·) are bounded, measurable, and continuous in
ai,t.
• The function vi(ai,t) ≡ ¯ vi(ai,t)−
¯
vi(ai,t) is strictly increasing in (−ai,ti). Payoﬀs
are normalised so that for all i ∈ I, |vi(·,·)| ≤ 1.
• Let the allocation rule be denoted ψi(a), which speciﬁes the probability that player i
10For example, this feature is clearly satisﬁed in ﬁrst-price auctions, where
¯
vi = 0; and all-pay auctions,
where
¯
vi = −ai.
21wins given the vectors of actions a. ψi(a) : A → [0,1] is such that, with k units to
be allocated, player i receives the object with probability zero if k or more opponents
choose actions such that aj > ai, and with probability 1 if I − k opponents choose
actions such that aj < ai. The remaining events are ties, resolved randomly.
The expected utility of player i of type ti taking action ai, when its opponents play
the (behavioural) strategy proﬁle µ−i, is therefore
Ui(ai,ti;µ−i) =
Z
T−i¯
vi(ai,t)f(t−i|ti)dt−i +
Z
T−i
Ψi(ai,t−i;µ−i)vi(ai,t)f(t−i|ti)dt−i (8)
where
Ψi(ai,µ−i(t−i)) ≡
Z
A−i
ψi(ai,a−i)
Y
j6=i
dµj(·,tj).
Our objective is to ﬁnd assumptions that ensure that the expected utility in equation
(8) satisﬁes the uniform strict single-crossing and Lipschitz continuity conditions. We
need to make some assumptions on the payoﬀ function vi(ai,t), the conditional density
f(t−i|ti), and most crucially, the strategies that players use.
U1’ Uniformly Positive Sensitivity to Own Type. There is a η ∈ (0,∞) such that
for all ai, ti ≥ t0
i, a−i,t−i and i ∈ I,
vi(ai,ti,t−i) − vi(ai,t
0
i,t−i) ≥ η(ti − t
0
i).
22U2’ Lipschitz Continuity to Own Action. Let ∆vi(ai,a0
i,t) ≡ vi(ai,t) − vi(a0
i,t).
There is an ω ∈ (0,∞) such that for all ai ≥ a0
i, a−i,t, and i ∈ I,
|∆vi(ai,a
0
i,t)| ≤ ω(ai − a
0
i).
D1’ There is a ¯ ν ∈ (0,∞) such that f(t−i|ti) ≤ ¯ ν for all ti,t−i and i ∈ I.
D2’ There is a
¯
ν ∈ (0,∞) such that f(t−i|ti) ≥
¯
ν for all ti,t−i and i ∈ I.
D3’ There is a τ ∈ (0,∞) such that for any ti ≥ t0
i and i ∈ I,
|f(t−i|ti) − f(t−i|t
0
i)| ≤ τ(ti − t
0
i).
S1 Fix K ≥ 1. ∀ i, let ΣK
i be the set of admissible strategies for player i. If µi ∈ ΣK
i ,
then µi is a uniformly increasing pure strategy with uniform constant K: for any
ti ∈ Ti, µi(·,ti) assigns probability 1 to some action α(ti) ∈ Ai, and probability 0
to all other actions; and
1
K
≤
α(ti) − α(t0
i)
ti − t0
i
≤ K ∀ ti 6= t
0
i.
Assumptions U1’ and U2’ are fairly mild. Consider the case of risk neutral bidders
with private values in a ﬁrst-price auction for a single unit. Suppose that the payoﬀ from
losing is zero and from winning is ti − ai. With these payoﬀs, assumptions U1’ and U2’
are satisﬁed, with η = 1 and ω = 1.
Assumptions D1’ and D2’ require the conditional density to be suﬃciently ﬂat, but
uniformly bounded away from zero. Both assumptions eﬀectively require that a player’s
type does not contain too much information about its rivals’ types, in terms of both
what types they might have (since the conditional density is bounded above), and what
23types that do not have (since the density is bounded below). Assumption D1’ is stronger
than its counterpart in section 3, assumption D2, since the former places a condition on
f(t−i|t0
i) instead of fj(tj|ti). Assumption D2’ has no counterpart in section 3. Assumption
D3’ replaces assumption D1 as a measure of diﬀerential information, and again is related
to (but stronger than) Grandmont (1992)’s notion of heterogeneity.
To illustrate these assumptions, suppose that there are two players whose types may
take one of two values: ti ∈ {
¯
t,¯ t} for i ∈ {1,2}, where 0 <
¯
t < ¯ t < +∞. Let the
conditional densities be as follows: conditional on player i being type
¯
t (¯ t), the probability
of player j 6= i being type
¯
t (¯ t) is q ∈ [0.5,1]. Assumption U1’ is then satisﬁed, with ¯ ν = 1.
Assumption U2’ requires that q be bounded away from 0 and 1: for a given
¯
ν, q ∈ [
¯
ν,1−
¯
v].
Assumption D3’ is satisﬁed with τ = 1.
Assumption S1 has previously been used by Cho (2005). It is the most awkward of
the assumptions. It requires that all players use strategies that are strictly increasing,
Lipschitz continuous pure strategies. As K → ∞, any strictly increasing strategy can be
approximated; the smaller is K, the more restrictive is the assumption. But note that,
whatever value of K is speciﬁed, the assumption still requires that strategies be monotonic
and pure. Hence, in this section, we shall be able to establish conditions for the existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium, conditional on players using monotone pure strategies
that satisfy assumption S1. The result for discontinuous games is therefore weaker than
for continuous games, where uniqueness can be established without any restriction on
strategies. But, as the proofs of theorems 5 and 6 make clear, this restriction on strategies
is unavoidable if we are to accommodate discontinuous games.
First, we need to establish the existence of best responses within the set of strategies
ΣK ≡
QI
i=1 ΣK
i . Cho (2005) shows that for any given K, ∀i,ΣK
i is compact. Since
strategies are required to be strictly increasing, the probability of a tie (multiple winning
bids) is zero. Hence the interim expected utility function is continuous; and so the best
response correspondence is nonempty and compact. That is, for any vector of strategies
α ∈ ΣK, the best response correspondence φ(α) is non-empty and is in ΣK.
24We now turn to the conditions that are required to establish uniform strict single-
crossing and Lipschitz continuity—the counterparts to theorems 2 and 3 for continuous
games.
Theorem 5 Consider a standard auction (see deﬁnition 3); and suppose that assump-
tions U1’, D2’, D3’ and S1 hold. If
η
¯
ν
K
> τK,
then uniform strict single-crossing is satisﬁed, with ϕ1 ≡ η
¯
ν/K − τK > 0.
Theorem 6 Consider a standard auction (see deﬁnition 3); and suppose that assump-
tions U2’, D1’ and S1. Then Lipschitz continuity is satisﬁed, with ϕ2 ≡ (K + ω)¯ ν.
Theorems 5 and 6 can be combined to give the main result for discontinuous games.
Theorem 7 Consider a standard auction (see deﬁnition 3). If assumptions U1’–U2’,
D1’–D3’ and S1 hold; and if
η
¯
ν/K > τK + (K + ω)¯ ν, (9)
then the best response correspondence is a contraction; and hence there is a unique equi-
librium in monotone pure strategies of the Bayesian game.
The suﬃcient condition (9) makes clear the problems that arise without restricting
players’ strategy sets. As K → ∞, so that any monotone pure strategy is allowed, the
left-hand side of the condition tends to zero. Condition (9) would therefore be violated
unless τ = ¯ ν = 0. But the latter is ruled out by the requirement in assumptions D1’
and D2’ that 0 <
¯
ν ≤ ¯ ν. For any ﬁnite K, condition (9) is satisﬁed if (i) the conditional
density f(ti−|ti) is suﬃciently ‘ﬂat’, in the sense that the ratio
¯
ν/¯ ν ≤ 1 is suﬃciently
large and/or τ is suﬃciently small; (ii) a player’s valuation is suﬃciently sensitive to its
type (η is suﬃciently large); and (iii) ω is suﬃciently small: a player’s action does not
aﬀect its payoﬀ too much.
25Theorem 7 oﬀers the possibility of establishing the existence of a monotone pure
strategy equilibrium in a broad range of auctions. Reny and Zamir (2004) establish
the existence of this type of equilibrium in ﬁrst-price auctions for a single unit under
very general conditions: asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and aﬃliated one-
dimensional signals. Outside of single-unit ﬁrst-price auctions, results are more limited.
For example, for all-pay auctions (in which players pay their bids regardless of whether
they win or lose), existence has been established only with independent private values and
(weakly) risk averse bidders; or positive value interdependence but independent informa-
tion. See Athey (2001). Theorem 7 can be used to establish existence of monotone pure
strategy equilibrium for all-pay auctions with interdependent values and information. For
multi-unit ﬁrst-price auctions, in which each bidder demands a single unit, Athey (2001)
establishes existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are independent
private values and bidders are not too risk-loving. Theorem 7 can be used to establish
existence for cases with interdependent values and information.
The theorem has some bite in terms of uniqueness, although less than the result for
continuous games. The logic of theorem 7 is as follows: for a ﬁxed K which, given the
other model parameters, satisﬁes condition 9, there is a unique equilibrium in monotone
pure strategies which belong to the set ΣK. This conclusion can be repeated for diﬀerent
values of K, all of which satisfy condition 9. The result is a set of equilibria, parameterised
by K. This may be of use, particularly for numerical analysis of auctions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a suﬃcient condition for there to be a unique equilibrium,
which is in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information. The condition
involves uniform strict single-crossing and Lipschitz continuity of the incremental interim
payoﬀ, and ensures that the equilibrium mapping is a contraction. We provide a charac-
terization of uniform strict single-crossing and Lipschitz continuity in terms of the model
26primitives, for continuous and discontinuous games. The characterization is easy to check
in applications, as well as having a clear economic interpretation.
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
Let α and α0 be two distinct joint monotone pure strategies. Moreover, suppose that
φ(α) and φ(α0) are distinct. The deﬁnition of the metric in (2) implies that, for i ∈ I
d(φ(α),φ(α
0)) = (ti − t
0
i) (A.10)
for some ti,t0
i. The deﬁnition of the metric implies that αi(t0
i + ε) > ρ > α0
i(ti − ε) or
αi(t0
i + ε) < ρ < α0
i(ti − ε) for all ε > 0 such that ti − ε > t0
i + ε and for some ρ ∈ R.
Without loss of generality suppose that the ﬁrst inequality holds. Then the best reply
aiε of player i at t0
i +ε against α−i is strictly greater than the best reply a0
iε of player i at
ti − ε against α0
−i. This also implies that
∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,t
0
i + ε,α−i) ≥ 0, (A.11a)
∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,ti − ε,α
0
−i) ≤ 0. (A.11b)
It follows from uniform strict single-crossing that
∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,ti − ε,α−i) − ∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,t
0
i + ε,α−i) ≥ ϕ1(aiε − a
0
iε)(ti − t
0
i − 2ε), (A.12a)
∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,ti − ε,α
0
−i) − ∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,t
0
i + ε,α
0
−i) ≥ ϕ1(aiε − a
0
iε)(ti − t
0
i − 2ε). (A.12b)
Now equations (A.11a) and (A.12a) and imply that
∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,ti − ε,α−i) ≥ 0. (A.13a)
27Similarly, equations (A.11b) and (A.12b) and imply that
∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,t
0
i + ε,α
0
−i) ≤ 0. (A.13b)
Next it follows from Lipschitz-continuity that
|∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,ti − ε,α−i) − ∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,ti − ε,α
0
−i)| ≤ ϕ2(aiε − a
0
iε)d(α−i,α
0
−i), (A.14a)
|∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,t
0
i + ε,α−i) − ∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,t
0
i + ε,α
0
−i)| ≤ ϕ2(aiε − a
0
iε)d(α−i,α
0
−i). (A.14b)
Now equations (A.11b), (A.13a) and (A.14a) and imply that
0 ≤ ∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,ti − ε,α−i) ≤ ϕ2(aiε − a
0
iε)d(α−i,α
0
−i). (A.15a)
Similarly, equations (A.11a) and (A.13b) and (A.14b) imply that
0 ≤ ∆Ui(aiε,a
0
iε,t
0
i + ε,α−i) ≤ ϕ2(aiε − a
0
iε)d(α−i,α
0
−i). (A.15b)
Combining equations (A.15a) and (A.15b) with (A.12a) leads to
ϕ1(aiε − a
0
iε)(ti − t
0
i − 2ε) ≤ ϕ2(aiε − a
0
iε)d(α−i,α
0
−i).
Dividing both sides by (aiε − a0
iε) > 0 and taking the limit ε → 0 leads to
ϕ1(ti − t
0
i) ≤ ϕ2d(α−i,α
0
−i).
Using the fact (A.10) and the deﬁnition of the metric, we obtain
ϕ1d(φ(α),φ(α
0)) ≤ ϕ2d(α−i,α
0
−i) ≤ ϕ2d(α,α
0) (A.16)
which proves our theorem. 
28B Proof of Theorem 2
By deﬁnition,
∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,α−i)
=
Z
T−i
∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),ti,t−i)f(t−i|ti)dt−i
−
Z
T−i
∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),t
0
i,t−i)f(t−i|t
0
i)dt−i
=
Z
T−i
[∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),ti,t−i) − ∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),t
0
i,t−i)]f(t−i|ti)dt−i
−
Z
T−i
∆ui(ai,α−i(t−i),t
0
i,t−i)[f(t−i|t
0
i) − f(t−i|ti)]dt−i. (B.17)
From assumption U1, we obtain for the ﬁrst term that
Z
T−i
[∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),ti,t−i) − ∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),t
0
i,t−i)]f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≥ δ(ai − a
0
i)(ti − t
0
i). (B.18)
Now consider the second term in equation (B.17). The integral can be separated, so
that
Z
T−i
∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),t
0
i,t−i)[f(t−i|t
0
i) − f(t−i|ti)]dt−i
=
Z
T−i
[∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),t
0
i,t−i)]
f(t−i|t0
i) − f(t−i|ti)
f(t−i|ti)
f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≤
Z
T−i
[∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),t
0
i,t−i)]
2 f(t−i|ti)dt−i
1/2
×
 Z
T−i

f(t−i|t0
i) − f(t−i|ti)
f(t−i|ti)
2
f(t−i|ti)dt−i
!1/2
(B.19)
where in the last line, we use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Using assumption U2 and the fact ai ≥ a0
i yields an upper bound on the ﬁrst term of
29the product in equation (B.19),
Z
T−i
[∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),t
0
i,t−i)]
2 f(t−i|ti)dt−i
1/2
≤ ω(ai − a
0
i). (B.20)
For the second term of the product in equation (B.19),
 Z
T−i

f(t−i|t0
i) − f(t−i|ti)
f(t−i|ti)
2
f(t−i|ti)dt−i
!1/2
=
s
VarT−i

f(t−i|t0
i) − f(t−i|ti)
f(t−i|ti)

because
ET−i

f(t−i|t0
i) − f(t−i|ti)
f(t−i|ti)

=
Z
T−i
f(t−i|t0
i) − f(t−i|ti)
f(t−i|ti)
f(t−i|ti)dt−i
=
Z
T−i
(f(t−i|t
0
i) − f(t−i|ti))dt−i = 0
since
R
T−i f(t−i|ti)dt−i =
R
T−i f(t−i|t0
i)dt−i = 1. Therefore from assumption D1,
 Z
T−i

f(t−i|t0
i) − f(t−i|ti)
f(t−i|ti)
2
f(t−i|ti)dt−i
!1/2
≤ ι(ti − t
0
i) (B.21)
Combining equation (B.17) with equations (B.18)–(B.21) yields
∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,α−i) ≥ (δ − ιω)(ai − a
0
i)(ti − t
0
i). (B.22)
This proves the theorem. 
C Proof of Theorem 3
By deﬁnition,
  ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i

 
≤
Z
T−i

∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),t) − ∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α
0
−i(t−i),t)

f(t−i|ti)dt−i.
(C.23)
30Next let
˜ Tj(ρ,αj,α
0
j) = {tj ∈ Tj : αj(tj) < ρ < α
0
j(tj) ∨ α
0
j(tj) < ρ < αj(tj),ρ ∈ R} (C.24)
and let the indicator function χj(tj,ρ,αj,α0
j) be deﬁned as
χj(tj,ρ,αj,α
0
j) =

   
   
1 if tj ∈ ˜ Tj(ρ,αj,α0
j)
0 otherwise.
(C.25)
First note that if α−i = α0
−i, then supj6=i supρ∈R χj(tj,ρ,αj,α0
j) = 0 and the right
hand side of equation (C.23) is zero too. Otherwise, consider a ˜ t−i such that α−i(˜ t−i) 6=
α0
−i(˜ t−i). Then supj6=i supρ∈R χj(˜ tj,ρ,αj,α0
j) = 1 and the right hand side of equation
(C.23) is positive. Hence we can write (C.23) as
  ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i)−∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α
0
−i)
  
≤
Z
T−i
 ∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α−i(t−i),t) − ∆ui(ai,a
0
i,α
0
−i(t−i),t)
 
× sup
j6=i
sup
ρ∈R
χj(tj,ρ,αj,α
0
j)f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≤
Z
T−i
κ(ai − a
0
i)sup
j6=i
sup
ρ∈R
χj(tj,ρ,αj,α
0
j)f(t−i|ti)dt−i
where in the last step we used assumption U3.
It follows from this that
  ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α
0
−i)

 
≤ κ(ai − a
0
i)
Z
T−i
sup
j6=i
sup
ρ∈R
χj(tj,ρ,αj,α
0
j)f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≤ κ(ai − a
0
i)sup
j6=i
sup
ρ∈R
Z
T−i
χj(tj,ρ,αj,α
0
j)f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≤ κ(ai − a
0
i)sup
j6=i
sup
ρ∈R
Z
Tj
χj(tj,ρ,αj,α
0
j)f(tj|ti)dtj
31Finally, assumption D2 requires that fj(tj|ti) ≤ ν; this leads to
  ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,α
0
−i)
  
≤ κ(ai − a
0
i)sup
j6=i
sup
ρ∈R
Z
Tj
χj(tj,ρ,αj,α
0
j)νdtj
≤ νκ(ai − a
0
i)sup
j6=i
sup
ρ∈R
Z
Tj
χj(tj,ρ,αj,α
0
j)dtj
= νκ(ai − a
0
i)d(α−i,α
0
−i).
The last step follows from the observation that
R
Tj χj(tj,ρ,αj,α0
j)dtj is an interval satis-
fying the inequality conditions in the deﬁnition of the metric with respect to ρ.
Hence there exists a ϕ2 ≡ νκ > 0 such that Lipschitz continuity is satisﬁed. 
D Proof of Theorem 5
For ai > a0
i and ti > t0
i,
∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,µ−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,µ−i) =
Z
T−i
∆
¯
vi(ai,a
0
i,ti,t−i)f(t−i|ti)dt−i −
Z
T−i
∆
¯
vi(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,t−i)f(t−i|t
0
i)dt−i
+
Z
T−i
[Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i;))vi(ai,ti,t−i) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))vi(a
0
i,ti,t−i)]f(t−i|ti)dt−i
−
Z
T−i
[Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i))vi(ai,t
0
i,t−i) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i;))vi(a
0
i,t
0
i,t−i)]f(t−i|t
0
i)dt−i.
From the properties of a standard auction in deﬁnition 3, the ﬁrst line in this expression
is non-negative. Let
∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i(t−i)) ≡ Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i))vi(ai,ti,t−i) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))vi(a
0
i,ti,t−i).
32Then
Z
T−i
∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i(t−i))f(t−i|ti)dt−i −
Z
T−i
∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,α−i(t−i))f(t−i|t
0
i)dt−i
=
Z
T−i
[∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i(t−i)) − ∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,α−i(t−i))]f(t−i|ti)dt−i
−
Z
T−i
∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,α−i(t−i))[f(t−i|t
0
i) − f(t−i|ti)]dt−i. (D.26)
Consider the ﬁrst term in the above expression:
∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i(t−i)) − ∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,α−i(t−i))
= [Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i))vi(ai,ti,t−i) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))vi(a
0
i,ti,t−i)]
− [Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i))vi(ai,t
0
i,t−i) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))vi(a
0
i,t
0
i,t−i)]
≥
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i)) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))
 
vi(ai,ti,t−i) − vi(ai,t
0
i,t−i)

,
where we use the fact that vi(·,·) is strictly increasing in (−ai,ti). Therefore for the ﬁrst
term we have
Z
T−i
[∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,ti,α−i(t−i)) − ∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,α−i(t−i))]f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≥
Z
T−i
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i)) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))
 
vi(ai,ti,t−i) − vi(ai,t
0
i,t−i)

f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≥ η(ti − t
0
i)
Z
T−i
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i)) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))

f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≥ η
¯
ν(ti − t
0
i)
Z
T−i
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i)) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))

dt−i
≥
η
¯
ν
K
(ai − a
0
i)(ti − t
0
i).
In these successive inequalities, we use assumptions U1’, D2’, and S1 respectively. To see
33the last step, note that
Z
T−i
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i)) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))

f(t−i|ti)dt−i
=
Z
T−i
Z
A−i
 
ψi(ai,a−i) − ψi(a
0
i,a−i)
Y
j6=i
dµj(·,tj)f(t−i|ti)dt−i.
Given t−i ∈ T−i, let ¯ a(α−i,t−i) be the largest element of the vector α−i(t−i). Then
ψi(ai,a−i(α−i,t−i)) =

  
  
1 ai > ¯ a(α−i,t−i)
0 ai < ¯ a(α−i,t−i).
(Ties can be ignored, since all strategies are strictly increasing and f(t−i|ti) is atomless.)
Hence
ψi(ai,a−i(α−i,t−i)) − ψi(a
0
i,a−i(α−i,t−i)) =

  
  
1 ai > ¯ a(α−i,t−i) > a0
i
0 otherwise.
So, deﬁne t−i(ai,α−i) to be such that ¯ a(α−i,t−i(ai,α−i)) = ai, and t−i(a0
i,α−i) similarly.
By assumption S1, for any j 6= i,
tj(ai,α−i) − tj(a
0
i,α−i) ≥
1
K
(ai − a
0
i).
Therefore
Z
T−i
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i)) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))

dt−i ≥
1
K
(ai − a
0
i).
34Now consider the second term in equation (D.26):

   
Z
T−i
∆ˆ vi(ai,a
0
i,t
0
i,α−i(t−i))[f(t−i|t
0
i) − f(t−i|ti)]dt−i
 
  
=
 
  
Z
T−i
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i))vi(ai,ti,t−i) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))vi(a
0
i,ti,t−i)

[f(t−i|t
0
i) − f(t−i|ti)]dt−i
 
  
≤
Z
T−i
  
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i))vi(ai,ti,t−i) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))vi(a
0
i,ti,t−i)
 

 
f(t−i|t
0
i) − f(t−i|ti)
 
dt−i
≤
Z
T−i
  
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i)) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))

vi(a
0
i,ti,t−i)
  
  f(t−i|t
0
i) − f(t−i|ti)
  dt−i
≤
Z
T−i
  
 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i)) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))

 

 f(t−i|t
0
i) − f(t−i|ti)

 dt−i
≤ τ(ti − t
0
i)
Z
T−i
 

 
Ψi(ai,α−i(t−i)) − Ψi(a
0
i,α−i(t−i))
 
dt−i
≤ τK(ai − a
0
i)(ti − t
0
i)
where in the successive inequalities, we have used the property of norms; vi(·,·) is non-
increasing in ai; |vi(·,·)| ≤ 1; assumption D3’; and ﬁnally assumption S1. This completes
the proof. 
E Proof of Theorem 6
By deﬁnition,

 ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,µ−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,µ
0
−i)

 
=
  
 
Z
T−i
h 
Ψ(ai,α−i)vi(ai,t) − Ψ(a
0
i,α−i)vi(a
0
i,t)

−
 
Ψ(ai,α
0
−i)vi(ai,t) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0−i)vi(a
0
i,t)
i
f(t−i|ti)dt−i
  
 
.
35Rearranging gives

 ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,µ−i) − ∆Ui(ai,a
0
i,ti,µ
0
−i)

 
=
  
 
Z
T−i
h 
Ψ(ai,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α−i)

−
 
Ψ(ai,α
0
−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)

vi(ai,t)
+
 
Ψ(a
0
i,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)

(vi(ai,t) − vi(a
0
i,t))
i
f(t−i|ti)dt−i
  
 
. (E.27)
Starting with the ﬁrst term,
  
 
Z
T−i
 
Ψ(ai,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α−i)

−
 
Ψ(ai,α
0
−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)

vi(ai,t)f(t−i|ti)dt−i
  
 
≤
Z
T−i
  
 
Ψ(ai,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α−i)

−
 
Ψ(ai,α
0
−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)
  |vi(ai,t)|f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≤
Z
T−i
  
 
Ψ(ai,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α−i)

−
 
Ψ(ai,α
0
−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)

 f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≤ ¯ ν
Z
T−i
 

 
Ψ(ai,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α−i)

−
 
Ψ(ai,α
0
−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)
 
dt−i,
The ﬁnal integral can be bounded above:
Z
T−i

 
 
Ψ(ai,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α−i)

−
 
Ψ(ai,α
0
−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)

 dt−i ≤
Z
T−i

 Ψ(ai,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α−i)

 dt−i.
Using the same step as in the proof of theorem 3, this can be written as
Z
T−i
  Ψ(ai,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α−i)
  sup
j6=i
sup
ρ∈R
χj(tj,ρ,αj,α
0
j)dt−i.
Hence the ﬁrst term in equation (E.27) can be bounded above by
¯ νK(ai − a
0
i)d(α−i,α
0
−i),
so that the Lipschitz constant for this term is ¯ νK.
36Turning now to the second term
 
  
Z
T−i
 
Ψ(a
0
i,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)

(vi(ai,t) − vi(a
0
i,t))f(t−i|ti)dt−i
 
  
≤
Z
T−i
  
 
Ψ(a
0
i,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)
  
  (vi(ai,t) − vi(a
0
i,t))
  f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≤ ω(ai − a
0
i)
Z
T−i
  
 
Ψ(a
0
i,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)
  f(t−i|ti)dt−i
≤ ω¯ ν(ai − a
0
i)
Z
T−i

 
 
Ψ(a
0
i,α−i) − Ψ(a
0
i,α
0
−i)

 dt−i
≤ ω¯ ν(ai − a
0
i)d(α−i,α
0
−i)
where in the successive inequalities, we use the property of norms; assumption U2’; as-
sumption D1’; and, in the ﬁnal step, the deﬁnition of the metric d(·,·). This completes
the proof. 
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